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The persistence of both core and headline CPI  • 
inﬂ  ation in Canada has declined signiﬁ  cantly 
relative to the 1980s.
The adoption of explicit inﬂ  ation targets in 1991  • 
likely played a key role in this decline. The impact 
of more activist monetary policy and lower 
variance of long-run inﬂ  ation expectations on 
wage- and price-setting behaviour appears to 
have been particularly important. This suggests 
that the degree of structural inﬂ  ation persistence 
is low in Canada.
The degree of structural inﬂ  ation persistence has  • 
important implications for the speed with which 
inﬂ  ation should be returned to target, the degree 
to which policy should be forward looking, and 
the relative merits of inﬂ  ation- and price-level 
targeting. Other things being equal, price-level 
targeting is more effective as a stabilization tool 
when structural inﬂ  ation persistence is low.
L
ongworth (2002) documents changes to the 
dynamic properties of several key macro-
economic variables in Canada that occurred 
around the beginning of the 1990s. Noteworthy 
among these changes is a reduction in the level, 
variance, and persistence of various measures of 
price inﬂ  ation, including the consumer price index 
(CPI). While each change is signiﬁ  cant in its own right, 
the focus of this article is on the reduction in inﬂ  ation 
persistence, deﬁ  ned here as the correlation between 
current and lagged inﬂ  ation. In addition to updating 
certain estimates of inﬂ  ation persistence, the article 
examines possible reasons for the decline that have 
been suggested in the economics literature. In 
particular, a distinction is drawn between the role 
played by monetary policy, through its effect on 
price- and wage-setting behaviour, and possible 
changes to the structure of the economy that are 
independent of monetary policy, including the distri-
bution of shocks. Finally, a normative analysis of the 
desirability of low inﬂ  ation persistence is provided 
from the viewpoints of an inﬂ  ation-targeting (IT) and a 
price-level-targeting (PLT) central bank.
At ﬁ  rst glance, it may seem surprising that the Bank of 
Canada should be concerned about inﬂ  ation persis-
tence or its causes. After all, the Bank’s mandate is to 
maintain the level of inﬂ  ation close to the midpoint of 
the target range. The extent and causes of inﬂ  ation 
persistence can be very important, however, in 
determining the optimal way to achieve the Bank’s 
current mandate of inﬂ  ation control. 
By deﬁ  nition, a variable that is persistent responds 
more sluggishly in the short run, other things being 
equal. This is analogous to the difference in manoeuv-
rability between a speedboat and an ocean liner. 
Since an ocean liner has a great deal of momentum 
because of its enormous mass, there is a consider-
able lag before changes to its intended path are fully 
reﬂ  ected in its actual path. For a central bank that 
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1 In addition to theoretical arguments 
linking the conduct of policy to the behaviour of 
inﬂ  ation, formal statistical tests tend to support the 
early 1990s as the period in which the changes began 
to occur.
2
Table 1 summarizes changes in the estimated degree 
of persistence for total and core CPI inﬂ  ation, and 
both series are plotted in Chart 1. Persistence is 
estimated for both the year-over-year change and the 
quarterly change in each price index.
3 For quarterly 
(year-over-year) inﬂ  ation, persistence is deﬁ  ned by 
the correlation between current inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation 
lagged one (four) quarter(s). The key message is that 
the degree of persistence displayed by both core 
and headline CPI inﬂ  ation has declined signiﬁ  cantly, 
relative to the 1980s. These results are qualitatively 
similar to recent estimates in Benati (2008) and Levin, 
Natalucci, and Piger (2004).
4 Benati (2008), in particu-
lar, emphasizes that quarterly inﬂ  ation in Canada now 
appears to display no persistence whatsoever. This 
means that, on average, the current-period rate of 
inﬂ  ation is uninformative for predicting the rate of 
inﬂ  ation in the next period.
Why Has Persistence Declined?
Sources of inﬂ  ation persistence
A natural starting point for discussing inﬂ  ation dynam-
ics is the price Phillips curve, which generally models 
inﬂ  ation as a function of lagged inﬂ  ation, one or more 
relative prices, and a measure of capacity pressures, 
such as the unemployment or output gap. In recent 
years, one particular variant of this model, referred to 
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) has taken 
on particular prominence at central banks and among 
academics, primarily because it can be rationalized 
1  In February 1991, the Bank of Canada (in a joint statement with the 
Minister of Finance) announced the introduction of an inﬂ  ation-
reduction target. The period between 1982 and 1990 has been 
labelled the search for a new nominal anchor, since the Bank 
determined in 1982 that it would no longer target M1 (Thiessen 
2000).
2  Qualitatively similar declines in persistence have been observed for 
other countries that adopted inﬂ  ation targeting. Benati (2008) 
presents recent evidence for the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Switzerland, New Zealand, and the euro area under the European 
Monetary Union.
3  We use quarterly data to facilitate comparison with the artiﬁ  cial data 
generated by ToTEM (discussed in the next section). Statistics 
reported in Longworth (2002) are based on monthly data.
4  Benati (2008) reports an estimate of -0.3 for the sum of the 
autoregressive parameters of an AR(p) model, whereas Levin, 
Natalucci, and Piger (2004) report -0.2 for the largest autoregressive 
root, both for the IT sample. Negative estimates may be due to an 
apparent negative fourth-order partial correlation in the seasonally 
adjusted CPI data.
regards inﬂ  ation as highly inertial for reasons 
unrelated to the conduct of monetary policy, that 
policy must be set based on a projection of where 
inﬂ  ation will be in the future, rather than on its current 
level. This is precisely because policy actions will have 
their maximum impact on inﬂ  ation several periods 
after the action is initiated.
Inﬂ  ation persistence, as well as its underlying causes, 
is relevant not only to the Bank’s achievement of its 
current inﬂ  ation target; it is also very signiﬁ  cant for 
determining what the ideal target should be. Since the 
Bank is currently exploring the potential beneﬁ  ts of 
replacing its current inﬂ  ation target with a target for 
the price level, the issue is of particular interest.
Finally, inﬂ  ation persistence is relevant not only for 
central banks. If prices and wages (or any other 
contract speciﬁ  ed in nominal terms) are adjusted only 
periodically, then knowing the degree of inﬂ  ation 
persistence is relevant when deciding the best price 
or wage to set, when given the opportunity to do so. 
For instance, if inﬂ  ation has recently been high and is 
known to be persistent, households will negotiate a 
higher nominal wage, since high inﬂ  ation is likely to 
persist into the future, eroding the real purchasing 
power of their wage through time. This can create a 
vicious circle, whereby persistence tends to beget 
even greater persistence because of the important 
role played by expectations. In this example, higher 
wages raise ﬁ  rms’ costs, which will be partly reﬂ  ected 
in higher prices. Therefore, price inﬂ  ation in the future 
will be higher for longer.
This article begins with a comparison of persistence 
estimates for total and core CPI inﬂ  ation for the 
periods 1980–90 and 1991–2009. Possible explana-
tions for the observed decline are then reviewed, 
including changes to the structure of the economy, 
changes in the distribution of shocks, and the estab-
lishment of a credible inﬂ  ation target by the Bank of 
Canada in 1991. The implications of low inﬂ  ation 
persistence for the conduct of monetary policy are 
then considered for both inﬂ  ation-targeting and 
price-level-targeting regimes. 
Revisiting Estimates of Inﬂ  ation 
Persistence 
Longworth (2002) focuses on changes to the persis-
tence of inﬂ  ation between the 1980s and 1990s. This 
is a natural division, given that the Bank of Canada 
adopted an explicit target for inﬂ  ation at the beginning 
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7 of production   periods 
in the future relative to the average level or steady 
state, and   is a random shock term. The latter term 
is often interpreted as capturing movements in ﬁ  rms’ 
desired markup of price over nominal marginal cost, 
and we also adopt this interpretation.  ,  , and   
are non-negative parameters, which are normally 
treated as ﬁ  xed through time.
The key assumption underlying this NKPC is that 
individual ﬁ  rms do not change prices every period, 
but that, when given the opportunity to do so, a 
positive proportion of ﬁ  rms rationally choose a price 
that maximizes their expected proﬁ  ts.
8 Since it is 
known that the chosen price will remain in effect for 
several periods, account is taken of both current and 
expected future marginal cost, meaning that inﬂ  ation 
is a forward-looking variable. The remaining ﬁ  rms are 
assumed to follow a simple rule of thumb (ROT), such 
as choosing the average price in the previous period, 
adjusted by the previous period’s inﬂ  ation rate. 
From equation (1), there are four potential sources of 
persistence: the long-run-expectations channel (LRE), 
captured by  ; expectations of current and future 
marginal cost (short-run-expectations channel (SRE)); 
the lagged inﬂ  ation term; and the desired markup. In 
general, the persistence, variance, and co-movement 
among these variables, along with the numerical 
values for  ,  , and  , will determine the persis-
tence of inﬂ  ation. 
The LRE channel can be interpreted as agents’ 
perception at time   of the rate of inﬂ  ation to which the 
economy would eventually converge in the absence of 
future shocks. If constant through time, the LRE will 
not be a source of persistence. Given the historical 
variation in the rate of inﬂ  ation in Canada (Chart 1) 
since the beginning of the 1980s, however, it seems 
reasonable to assume that   has varied somewhat 
7  Real marginal cost refers to the cost incurred by the ﬁ  rm of 
producing an additional unit of output, divided by the price that it 
receives for that output. Under certain circumstances, marginal cost 
is proportional to average cost.
8  The NKPC employed here follows Galí and Gertler (1999), which is an 
extension of the model proposed by Calvo (1983). The Calvo (1983) 
speciﬁ  cation obtains when  . A similar means for obtaining 
lagged inﬂ  ation in the NKPC has been proposed by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and generalized by Smets and 
Wouters (2007). In these versions, all ﬁ  rms set prices rationally when 
selected to reset. Firms not chosen in a given period can, neverthe-
less, index their price according to the lagged rate of price inﬂ  ation. 
These models are founded more on the premise that the cost of 
simply changing one’s price (i.e., pure menu costs) is small, but the 
cost of choosing a new price optimally is not, which explains why 
ﬁ  rms change price every period but re-optimize only periodically. 
This model of ﬁ  rm behaviour has been criticized because it makes 
the counterfactual prediction that all prices change every period 
(Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2009).
on the basis of microeconomic theory.
5 A generic 
form of the NKPC is given as:
 (1)
where   is the quarterly rate of inﬂ  ation,   is the 
rate of inﬂ  ation from the previous quarter,   is the 
inﬂ  ation rate expected to prevail in the distant future,
6 
5  The extent to which the ﬁ  xed-parameter version of the NKPC can 
be considered micro-founded is somewhat controversial, since, 
among other things, the most widely used version is based on the 
assumption that ﬁ  rms do not make a rational choice to adjust their 
price. Rather, ﬁ  rms are chosen according to a lottery system that 
ignores how long their nominal price has been in effect. 
6  Strictly speaking, the NKPC derived under the assumption of positive 
steady-state inﬂ  ation contains several additional terms (Ascari 
2004). These are not very important for explaining inﬂ  ation in the 
NKPC, however, and are omitted for simplicity.
Chart 1:  Consumer price index
Year-over-year percentage change, quarterly data
CPI excluding eight of the most volatile components and the effect of changes in indirect  a. 
taxes on the remaining components











2007 2002 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977 1972 1967 1962
Total CPI Core CPIa
Table 1:  Correlation between current and past 
inﬂ  ation 






Quarterly changea Corr.  0.80b 0.14
Year-over-year change Corr.  0.79b -0.13
Core CPI
Quarterly changea Corr.  0.82b 0.05
Year-over-year change Corr.  0.77b -0.04
Quarterly inﬂ  ation is deﬁ  ned as  a.  , whereas year-over-year is 
deﬁ  ned as   .
Indicates that the point estimate is signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the 1-per-cent  b. 
level.
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in Canada appears to have 
roughly coincided with the 
Bank of Canada’s adoption of 
an inﬂ  ation target in 1991.
The ﬁ  rst channel is through private agents’ long-run 
expectations for inﬂ  ation, which should converge to 
the inﬂ  ation target once the credibility of the regime 
has been clearly established. As the variance of   
declines, so will the persistence of inﬂ  ation, since it 
will account for a smaller proportion of the overall 
variance in the level of inﬂ  ation. Monetary policy can 
potentially inﬂ  uence   in two ways. First, if long-run 
expectations are partially inﬂ  uenced by the shocks 
that govern short-run expectations, then policies that 
stabilize the latter will help to stabilize the former.
10 
Second, to the extent that a central bank can demon-
strate a commitment to a policy rule that is sufﬁ  ciently 
aggressive to eventually return inﬂ  ation to the target, 
long-run expectations should be stable, even if short-
run expectations respond to shocks.
11 Persistent 
deviations from the rule, on the other hand, can send 
a signal to private agents that the central bank’s 
long-run inﬂ  ation objective has changed.
There are three main ways of inferring long-run 
inﬂ  ation expectations, which are not directly observ-
able. The ﬁ  rst involves surveys of long-horizon 
inﬂ  ation forecasts. Both the 2-year-ahead survey 
prepared by the Conference Board of Canada and the 
6-to-10-year-ahead survey prepared by Consensus 
Economics suggest that long-run inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions in Canada have become less volatile since the 
adoption of IT, and are now essentially decoupled 
from current economic developments. This conclu-
sion is supported by more formal econometric 
evidence presented in Levin, Natalucci, and Piger 
(2004). The authors analyze the relationship between 
long-horizon inﬂ  ation expectations (proxied by private 
sector forecasts) and current inﬂ  ation for a panel of 
IT and non-IT countries, including Canada, and 
10  In the limiting case, where either   or  , the weight 
on lagged inﬂ  ation increases to one, and inﬂ  ation becomes very 
persistent.
11  A related strand of the literature assesses the role played by sticky 
long-run inﬂ  ation expectations in disinﬂ  ations. Erceg and Levin 
(2003) show that the inclusion of a perceived objective for long-run 
inﬂ  ation, which can differ from the actual central bank objective 
because of imperfect credibility, can explain both the persistence of 
inﬂ  ation and the large output costs, following a deliberate disinﬂ  ation 
by the monetary authority. An illustration of this approach for Canada 
can be found in Murchison and Rennison (2006, 76).
through time. Moreover, since ﬁ  rms are not likely to 
revise their estimate of the long-run inﬂ  ation rate 
signiﬁ  cantly from one period to the next, this variable 
will display low variance and high persistence, and 
this persistence will be transmitted to actual inﬂ  ation 
through the Phillips curve. 
All shocks except changes to the desired markup are 
transmitted to inﬂ  ation via their inﬂ  uence on marginal 
cost (relative to steady state). The overall persistence 
of marginal cost will depend on the composition of 
shocks in the economy, the degree to which the 
economy can adjust to the shock (including the 
degree of price and wage ﬂ  exibility), and as will be 
discussed in the next section, the conduct of monet-
ary policy.
When ROT price setters are present in the economy, 
parameter   will be positive, and current inﬂ  ation will 
be inﬂ  uenced by lagged inﬂ  ation. The value of this 
parameter is increasing, both in the share of ROT 
price setters and in the weight on lagged inﬂ  ation 
used in the rule of thumb.
9
For the remainder of the article, we use the term 
structural or intrinsic to refer to persistence that 
comes about via the inclusion of lagged inﬂ  ation in 
equation (1) when   is positive, as well as to any 
persistence inherent in the desired markup,  . It is 
worth noting that our deﬁ  nition of structural does not 
correspond to the more common policy-invariance 
property ﬁ  rst introduced by Lucas (1976), since we will 
discuss various ways in which the conduct of policy 
can inﬂ  uence  .
Potential causes of reduced persistence
Changes to the conduct of monetary policy
The previous section identiﬁ  es four possible sources 
of inﬂ  ation persistence. Given that the decline in 
persistence in Canada appears to have roughly 
coincided with the Bank of Canada’s adoption of an 
inﬂ  ation target in 1991, a natural starting point is 
discussion of the possible channels through which a 
change in monetary-policy regime might inﬂ  uence 
these variables.
9  In Galí and Gertler (1999), the weight on lagged inﬂ  ation is set to one; i.e., 
there is full indexation. Amano, Mendes, and Murchison (2009) develop 
a model where the rule of thumb is  , 
where   is the average price chosen in the preceding period,   is 
the indexation parameter, which can take on any value between 0 
and 1, and   is the desired (gross) markup.
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marginal cost and inﬂ  ation persistence, we must ﬁ  rst 
recall that the NKPC distinguishes between shocks 
that are transmitted to inﬂ  ation through marginal cost, 
including demand and productivity shocks, and 
shocks to ﬁ  rms’ desired markup of price over mar-
ginal cost,  . Since there is no particular reason to 
think that the persistence of marginal cost and the 
desired markup should be identical, their contribution 
to inﬂ  ation persistence will depend on their relative 
variance. The intuition for this is straightforward; for 
example, if all of the variance in inﬂ  ation were driven 
by marginal cost, only the persistence of marginal 
cost would matter. In this way, the variances of each 
variable are like weights that determine their inﬂ  uence 
on the properties of inﬂ  ation. Since measures of real 
marginal cost are usually found to be much more 
persistent than the desired markup, a decline in the 
variance of marginal cost relative to   will reduce 
inﬂ  ation persistence.
14
Provided that the variance of markup shocks is not 
too high, a more aggressive policy rule will also 
reduce the variance of output and marginal cost.
15 For 
instance, since marginal cost is heavily inﬂ  uenced by 
wages, its response to a shock will depend import-
antly on the size of the wage reaction. If households 
expect monetary policy to respond aggressively to 
keep inﬂ  ation close to the target, then the desired 
change in nominal wage and marginal cost will be 
smaller.
A hypothetical example of the persistence and 
variance channels for monetary policy is shown in 
Chart 2. The Bank of Canada’s main projection model 
for Canada, ToTEM, is used to simulate the reaction of 
marginal cost and quarterly (at annual rates) CPI 
inﬂ  ation to an unanticipated increase of 1 per cent in 
foreign aggregate demand, under two different 
calibrations of a simple monetary-policy rule given by:
 (2)
14  The ﬁ  rst-order autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient for the discounted sum of 
future marginal costs in ToTEM from 1981Q1 to 2009Q3 is 0.93, 
whereas the equivalent coefﬁ  cient for the desired markup is just 
0.27.
15  When faced with a markup shock, monetary policy stabilizes inﬂ  ation 
through its inﬂ  uence on marginal cost, making monetary policy a 
source of variance in marginal cost. As a result, if inﬂ  ation is 
predominantly driven by markup shocks, or if the central bank is 
concerned mainly with stabilizing inﬂ  ation, increasing the aggres-
siveness of the policy response could increase the variance of 
marginal cost. 
conclude that there is no link for the IT countries from 
1994 to 2003, whereas there is a positive relationship 
for the non-IT countries. 
The second approach involves inferring long-run 
inﬂ  ation expectations from differences between 
long-term nominal and real interest rates, which we 
will refer to as the inﬂ  ation premium. Gürkaynak et al. 
(2006) examine the reaction of both long-term nominal 
interest rates and the inﬂ  ation premium to unantici-
pated macroeconomic news in Canada and conclude 
that neither systematically responded from 1998 to 
2005.
12 Finally, Amano and Murchison (2006) estimate 
the perceived level of long-run inﬂ  ation for Canada 
using an unobserved-components model developed 
by Kozicki and Tinsley (1998, 2002). Their estimate 
suggests that the variance of long-run expectations 
declined by about half in the 1990s, relative to the 
1980s.
Monetary policy can inﬂ  uence 
inﬂ  ation persistence via its effect 
on both the variance and the 
persistence of real marginal cost.
Monetary policy can also inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation persis-
tence via its effect on both the variance and the 
persistence of real marginal cost (SRE channel). From 
equation (1) it can be seen that current inﬂ  ation 
depends on current and expected future real marginal 
cost. Therefore, if the persistence of marginal cost 
declines, other things being equal, so will the persis-
tence of inﬂ  ation. Taylor (2000) argues that moving 
from a high- to a low-inﬂ  ation environment has 
reduced the expected persistence of changes in 
marginal cost and, consequently, the degree of 
pass-through to prices. Murchison (2009) extends 
Taylor’s argument, suggesting that this change in 
persistence may be due to a change in the param-
eters of the central bank’s policy rule.
13 In the case of 
Canada, if monetary policy began responding more 
aggressively to economic developments that threaten 
to push inﬂ  ation away from the target, the expected 
persistence of real marginal cost and inﬂ  ation should 
decline.
12  Owing to data limitations, the authors do not compare the pre- and 
post-IT behaviour of inﬂ  ation expectations in Canada.
13  Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009) study the link between policy 
aggressiveness, the relative variance of technology shocks, and 
inﬂ  ation persistence in an NKPC for the United States.
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in response to a given level of expected inﬂ  ation or of 
the output gap, relative to the ﬁ  rst scenario. 
An increase in foreign real GDP generates an increase 
in demand for Canadian exports and a depreciation of 
the exchange rate, both of which put upward pressure 
on inﬂ  ation and the output gap. In the ﬁ  rst scenario, 
the policy interest rate is increased by a maximum 
of about 50 basis points by the end of the ﬁ  rst year. In 
the second scenario, the rate increases faster and by 
more, so that the increase is almost 70 basis points 
after one year. Overall, the nominal interest rate is 
higher in the second scenario for the ﬁ  rst two years. 
For a given expected rate of inﬂ  ation, a higher nominal 
interest rate will translate into a higher real rate, which 
acts to temper the rise in domestic demand and 
inﬂ  ation in Canada. Thus, a virtuous circle is created 
where   is the policy interest rate in period  ,   is the 
long-run steady-state level of interest rates,   is 
the period   expectation of inﬂ  ation in period  ,   
is the inﬂ  ation target, and   is the output gap.  , 
, and   are ﬁ  xed parameters that determine the 
degree of interest rate smoothing and the sensitivity 
of the policy rate to deviations of inﬂ  ation from target 
and to the output gap, respectively.
16 Note that   
determines the degree to which policy is forward 
looking and is referred to as the “feedback horizon.”
In the ﬁ  rst scenario, the parameter  , whose value 
inﬂ  uences proportionately the policy response to 
inﬂ  ation and to the output gap, is set to one. In the 
second scenario,  , meaning that the central 
16 The  values  ,  , and   are taken from 
Murchison (2009).
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Chart 2: Results of different policy responses to a foreign-demand shock of 1 per cent in ToTEM
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since 2000, then ToTEM predicts that the persistence 
of inﬂ  ation should have declined from about 0.8 in the 
1980s to about 0.35 since 1991. 
To summarize, ToTEM ascribes an important role to 
more activist monetary policy and a somewhat 
smaller role to reduced variability in long-run inﬂ  ation 
expectations. The inﬂ  uence of monetary policy via 
both the long-run and short-run expectations chan-
nels explains the majority of the decline in inﬂ  ation 
persistence in ToTEM, suggesting that high inﬂ  ation 
persistence is not intrinsic to the Canadian economy. 
This result is consistent with Benati (2008), who 
obtains an estimate of  0.19 for Canada over the 
IT period. Nevertheless, the full extent of the decline in 
overall persistence cannot be explained by changes 
to the behaviour of LRE and SRE alone in ToTEM, 
since the point estimate for quarterly CPI inﬂ  ation for 
the 1991–2009 sample is 0.14, whereas ToTEM 
predicts a value close to 0.35 when  . This 
suggests that other factors may have contributed to 
the decline. We next examine possible links between 
monetary policy and the parameters of the NKPC in 
equation (1).
The coefﬁ  cients of the NKPC are typically assumed to 
be invariant to the conduct of monetary policy. But 
major regime changes, such as the adoption of an 
inﬂ  ation target, may cause these parameters to 
change, which will inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation persistence. The 
direction of the change is not clear, however, since 
there are potentially offsetting effects. For instance, 
Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) argue that the move 
from an environment of high to low trend inﬂ  ation will 
in the second scenario, whereby lower expected 
inﬂ  ation generates a higher real interest rate, which 
puts additional downward pressure on inﬂ  ation. 
The difference in the magnitude of the policy 
response explains the smaller increase in marginal 
cost (reduced variance) and the faster return to its 
pre-shock level (slightly reduced persistence). Since 
the discounted sum of future marginal costs is 
reduced, the peak response of inﬂ  ation is nearly cut in 
half, and inﬂ  ation is back to its pre-shock level in two 
years, whereas inﬂ  ation remains above the target for 
several years in the ﬁ  rst scenario. 
To roughly quantify the link between the two expecta-
tions channels (LRE and SRE) and the conduct of 
monetary policy, ToTEM is again used to simulate the 
level of inﬂ  ation persistence for different calibrations 
of the monetary policy rule described by equation (2). 
The horizontal axis in Chart 3 gives the coefﬁ  cient  , 
which ranges from 1.0 to 3.0, in the monetary policy 
rule. The lowest value corresponds to the value 
estimated in Murchison (2009) for the 1970–83 period, 
and is similar to the rule presented in Gagnon and 
Ihrig (2001).
17
Chart 3 shows a modestly negative relationship 
between the aggressiveness of monetary policy and 
inﬂ  ation persistence when the variance of long-run 
inﬂ  ation expectations,  , is set equal to its historical 
value from 1981 to 1990.
18 When the LRE channel is 
active and monetary policy is largely passive (far left), 
ToTEM matches the persistence of quarterly inﬂ  ation 
over the 1981–90 period (0.8) quite closely. As policy 
becomes more aggressive, the persistence of mar-
ginal cost (via the SRE channel) declines, and the 
overall persistence of inﬂ  ation declines by a moderate 
amount. When long-run expectations are not well 
anchored, however, the extent to which policy can 
reduce persistence through the SRE channel is quite 
limited.
When the variance of   is set to zero, which is a 
reasonable depiction of long-run inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions since the establishment of a credible inﬂ  ation 
target in Canada, the negative relationship between 
policy aggressiveness and persistence is much more 
pronounced. Estimated policy rules are subject to 
considerable parameter uncertainty, but based on 
Lam and Tkacz (2004), we judge a value of 2 for   to 
be a reasonable calibration for the 1990s. If we further 
17  We are aware of no estimated policy rules for Canada over the 
1981–90 period. 
18  The calibration of   in ToTEM is discussed in Murchison and 
Rennison (2006, 48). Movements in long-run expectations are driven 
by persistent deviations from the policy rule.
Chart 3:  Inﬂ  ation persistence and monetary policy 
in ToTEM
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variance and persistence, 
households ﬁ  nd it optimal to 
reduce the extent of indexation.
To summarize, research using theoretical models 
predicts that monetary regimes that reduce the level 
and variance of inﬂ  ation will result in an increase to 
the average duration of nominal price and wage 
contracts and a decrease in the rate at which house-
holds index wages to lagged inﬂ  ation. Labour market 
data from Human Resources Development Canada 
support both of these predictions for Canada. For 
instance, the average life of private sector wage 
settlements was 28 months over the 1981–90 period 
and rose to 39 months for the period 1995 to 2009, 
while the average share of private sector wage 
settlements with COLA clauses declined from 31 per 
cent to 20 per cent for the same sample periods. 
Other things being equal, longer nominal price 
contracts will tend to make inﬂ  ation more persistent, 
while a reduction in nominal wage indexation will have 
the opposite effect, and the effect of longer wage 
contracts is ambiguous.
Causes unrelated to monetary policy
While the move to a transparent, easily understood, 
and credible target for monetary policy in Canada no 
doubt played an important role in the decline of 
inﬂ  ation persistence, other plausible explanations 
have been suggested in the literature; most notably, 
the structural change and the good luck arguments. 
While typically employed to explain the so-called 
Great Moderation, elements of these arguments also 
apply to the issue of inﬂ  ation persistence.
21 This 
stems from the fact that a reduction to the variance of 
real marginal cost will reduce inﬂ  ation persistence.
A reduction to the variance of 
real marginal cost will reduce 
inﬂ  ation persistence.
21 The term “Great Moderation” dates back to work by Kim and Nelson 
(1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), and Stock and Watson 
(2003a), which together document a decline in the variance of 
inﬂ  ation and output growth in the United States. Although the timing 
of the declines differs somewhat, similar reductions in variance have 
been observed for several other countries, including Canada 
(Longworth 2002).
lead ﬁ  rms to change prices less frequently. The 
intuition for this result is quite simple: in a world with 
positive trend inﬂ  ation and sticky prices, ﬁ  rms can no 
longer achieve their desired relative price each period 
because inﬂ  ation causes it to decline through time.
19 
The higher the rate of trend inﬂ  ation, the larger is 
the average difference between optimal and actual 
relative prices, meaning larger forgone proﬁ  ts for 
ﬁ  rms. Therefore, ﬁ  rms will have an incentive to change 
prices more frequently in a high-inﬂ  ation environment 
and less frequently when inﬂ  ation is low.
20
When prices become stickier, the parameter   in 
equation (1) declines, and, hence, price inﬂ  ation 
responds more slowly to differences between nominal 
marginal cost and the price level (real marginal cost). 
As a result, the gap takes longer to close, meaning 
that real marginal cost becomes more persistent. To 
summarize, to the extent that low and stable inﬂ  ation 
leads to greater nominal rigidity in goods and labour 
markets, inﬂ  ation will tend to become more persistent, 
other things being equal.
A similar argument can be made for the labour 
market. As wages become stickier, a ﬁ  rm’s marginal 
cost will tend to become more persistent, since 
wages are an important component of overall costs. 
However, stickier wages will also tend to reduce the 
variance of marginal cost. Therefore, the overall 
impact of inﬂ  ation persistence will depend on which 
of these offsetting effects dominates.
In contrast, Minford (2004), Minford, Nowell, and 
Webb (2003), and more recently, Amano, Ambler, and 
Ireland (forthcoming) study a labour market in which 
households that do not re-optimize their wage in a 
given period can still index their nominal wage to the 
previous period’s rate of inﬂ  ation. This form of indexa-
tion is intended to loosely mimic so-called cost-of-
living-adjustment (COLA) clauses, and acts as 
imperfect insurance against unanticipated shocks 
that affect households’ real wage. The authors ﬁ  nd 
that in an environment of lower inﬂ  ation variance and 
persistence, households ﬁ  nd it optimal to reduce the 
extent of indexation. Equivalently, this means that a 
lower proportion of households ﬁ  nd it optimal to have 
wage indexation built into their labour contract. While 
the focus of these papers is on the beneﬁ  ts of PLT 
compared with IT, the basic argument would appear 
to hold generally for policy regimes that produce 
greater economic stability. 
19  Assuming that prices are not indexed to steady-state inﬂ  ation each 
quarter.
20 Provided that the cost of changing prices does not depend import-
antly on the trend rate of inﬂ  ation.
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Monetary Policy in Canada
Low structural persistence in inﬂ  ation has potentially 
important implications for the conduct of monetary 
policy. For example, Levin and Williams (2003) show 
that the performance of monetary policy rules can be 
very sensitive to the level of structural inﬂ  ation persis-
tence. Similarly, Walsh (2003) demonstrates that 
targeting the price level yields beneﬁ  ts only if the 
degree of inﬂ  ation persistence is sufﬁ  ciently low. 
These authors provide examples of a general prin-
ciple: the degree of persistence in structural inﬂ  ation 
should be a key factor in the design of monetary 
policy.
Of particular interest are the implications of low 
inﬂ  ation persistence for inﬂ  ation-targeting (IT) and 
price-level-targeting (PLT) regimes. When monetary 
policy targets inﬂ  ation, changes in structural persis-
tence can have implications for the optimal speed 
with which inﬂ  ation should be returned to target, as 
well as the degree to which policy should be forward 
looking. Inﬂ  ation persistence can also alter the relative 
merits of IT and PLT. However, it is important to 
consider that structural inﬂ  ation persistence, as we 
deﬁ  ne it, can also be policy-regime dependent. In par-
ticular, behavioural changes could lead to higher 
structural persistence in inﬂ  ation under PLT than 
under IT.
Inﬂ  ation targeting
Canada adopted an IT regime in February 1991. When 
inﬂ  ation deviates from 2 per cent, the Bank of Canada 
aims to return it to target within 18 to 24 months.
23 
This is known as the “inﬂ  ation-target horizon.”
24
Low structural inﬂ  ation persistence implies a shorter 
optimal target horizon.
25 Consider the optimal 
response to a positive markup shock in the NKPC. If 
the central bank cares about variance in both inﬂ  ation 
and the output gap, it will choose to offset only part of 
the shock’s impact on inﬂ  ation by reducing aggregate 
demand and marginal cost. As the weight on lagged 
23 The policy of bringing inﬂ  ation back to target within a horizon of 18 to 
24 months is generally appropriate, although speciﬁ  c occasions may 
arise in which a somewhat shorter or longer time horizon might be 
considered. For example, Basant Roi and Mendes (2007) demon-
strate that, in the face of a large and persistent asset-price shock, it 
may be appropriate to take a somewhat longer view of the inﬂ  ation-
target horizon.
24 For an overview of issues related to the Bank’s inﬂ  ation-target 
horizon see Coletti, Selody, and Wilkins (2006).
25 Batini and Nelson (2001) introduce and formalize the concept of an 
optimal target horizon.
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), among others, 
argue that structural change, primarily in the form of 
improvements to inventory-management technology, 
reduced the variance of inventory investment, and 
hence, of output growth in the United States, begin-
ning around 1984. For Canada, however, the evidence 
is less clear cut. The decline in the variance of output 
growth, which does coincide roughly with the decline 
in inﬂ  ation persistence (Debs 2001), appears to have 
been driven by a combination of lower variance in the 
growth rate of goods consumption and of residential 
investment, which is more difﬁ  cult to link directly 
to structural change. The role played by inventory 
investment appears to be less important (Debs 
2001), and where evidence of a break has been found 
(Liu and Painchaud 2002), the timing of the change 
(1983) does not coincide with reduced inﬂ  ation 
persistence.
The good luck argument is based on the notion that 
the variance of adverse shocks has declined, and as a 
result, the variance of endogenous variables, such as 
output growth and inﬂ  ation, has also declined. To 
apply the good luck argument to the issue of inﬂ  ation 
persistence, it must be true that the relative variance 
of those shocks that cause persistent inﬂ  ation move-
ments has declined. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian 
(2009) use a New Keynesian model, similar to that 
given by equation (1), to demonstrate that a reduction 
in the relative variance of technology shocks, which 
are transmitted to inﬂ  ation through real marginal cost, 
could explain reduced inﬂ  ation persistence. They also 
present evidence for the United States that indicates a 
reduction to the relative variance of technology 
shocks. 
More generally, several authors have presented 
VAR-based evidence of a structural break in shock 
variances for the United States that coincides with the 
Great Moderation.
22 The difﬁ  culty with the good luck 
argument is that a structural break in the behaviour of 
monetary policy may itself explain the decline in these 
variances. If the model does not correctly control for 
other changes, such as the behaviour of the central 
bank’s policy rule, they will show up in the model’s 
error terms. This point is developed extensively in 
Benati and Surico (2009), who show that structural 
VAR-based methods will tend to indicate a spurious 
reduction in shock variances, even when the only 
change to the underlying structural model is an 
increase in the responsiveness of monetary policy to 
inﬂ  ation ﬂ  uctuations.
22 See Stock and Watson (2003b), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha 
(2006), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2008).
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the degree to which monetary policy should be 
forward looking. Monetary policy in an inﬂ  ation-
targeting regime is often characterized by a simple 
inﬂ  ation-forecast-based (IFB) rule of the form given by 
equation (2). The feedback horizon,  , is inversely 
related to the degree of structural persistence in 
inﬂ  ation. If inﬂ  ation is intrinsically persistent, then 
monetary policy must be forward looking to avoid 
taking action too late. All else being equal, the more 
persistent is inﬂ  ation, the longer it takes for policy to 
have its maximum impact on inﬂ  ation. If policy does 
not react until the full impact of inﬂ  ation is observed, 
then the peak impact of the policy response will occur 
after the effects of the shock have already begun to 
dissipate, meaning that policy will be behind the 
curve. This, in turn, will tend to destabilize output. 
Thus, the feedback horizon should be longer in 
environments with higher structural persistence in 
inﬂ  ation.
As Batini and Haldane (1999) note, the optimal 
feedback horizon tends to be closely related to the 
length of time it takes for a change in monetary policy 
to have its peak impact on inﬂ  ation. At this horizon, 
the cumulative change in demand conditions required 
to stabilize inﬂ  ation is minimized. If the feedback 
horizon is shorter than this, then policy must induce 
greater movements in aggregate demand to return 
inﬂ  ation to target. 
Price-level targeting
Recent research suggests that price-level targeting 
may have beneﬁ  cial properties relative to inﬂ  ation 
targeting. In particular, PLT can yield a lower variance 
in both inﬂ  ation and the output gap. This result is, 
however, sensitive to assumptions about the degree 
of inﬂ  ation persistence. 
PLT outperforms IT in a forward-looking environment 
because it induces stabilizing movements in expected 
future demand conditions—a term in the NKPC. As 
Ambler (2009) explains, stabilizing the price level after 
a positive markup shock requires a period of below-
average inﬂ  ation. The anticipation of this drop reduces 
the initial impact of the shock on inﬂ  ation. This 
improves the short-run trade-off between inﬂ  ation and 
output stabilization.
This result does not necessarily hold in a more 
general environment in which some ﬁ  rms use simple 
rules of thumb to set prices. For example, Coletti, 
Lalonde, and Muir (2008) show that as the proportion 
of ROT ﬁ  rms rises above 50 per cent, IT is preferred to 
PLT. Nevertheless, calibrating the NKPC to match the 
inﬂ  ation declines, the cumulative loss in output 
required to comply with a given target horizon will 
diminish. That is, less movement in output is required 
to stabilize inﬂ  ation when persistence is lower. Thus, 
reduced persistence implies that the central bank can 
return inﬂ  ation to target more quickly without incurring 
the cost of additional variance in the output gap. This, 
in turn, implies that the optimal target horizon short-
ens as the degree of structural inﬂ  ation persistence 
declines.
Low structural inﬂ  ation persistence 
implies a shorter optimal 
target horizon.
More formally, Steinsson (2003) shows that, as the 
proportion of forward-looking ﬁ  rms increases, it 
becomes optimal to undo a greater fraction of the 
impact of shocks on the long-run price level. Recall 
that, under inﬂ  ation targeting, a central bank stabilizes 
the rate of change of prices (inﬂ  ation), but not the level 
of prices. This implies that shocks that move inﬂ  ation 
away from target temporarily will have a permanent 
effect on the price level (known as price-level drift). 
Steinsson ﬁ  nds that greater forward-looking behav-
iour, and thus decreased inﬂ  ation persistence, is 
associated with lower optimal price-level drift.
Amano, Mendes, and Murchison (forthcoming) 
decompose the sources of optimal price-level drift. 
They note that a reduction in the number of rule-of-
thumb (ROT) ﬁ  rms has two effects on the NKPC: 
(i) it decreases the weight on lagged inﬂ  ation ( ), and 
(ii) it increases the weight on future demand condi-
tions (  and  ). Both of these changes serve to 
make inﬂ  ation more responsive to demand conditions. 
Thus, when there are fewer ROT ﬁ  rms in the economy, 
monetary policy can return inﬂ  ation to target, follow-
ing a markup shock, with less disruption to the real 
economy.
Similarly, a reduction in the weight of lagged inﬂ  ation 
in the ROT reduces the inﬂ  uence of lagged inﬂ  ation in 
the NKPC. Since lagged inﬂ  ation cannot be inﬂ  uenced 
by current policy, a reduction in the coefﬁ  cient on 
lagged inﬂ  ation enhances the ability of monetary 
policy to simultaneously stabilize inﬂ  ation and aggre-
gate demand.
26
26 This is also true for a decline in the persistence of markup shocks.
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performance of simple ROTs by reducing the variance 
of inﬂ  ation and output. This could lead to an increase 
in the number of ROT price-setters that would under-
mine the performance of PLT. Thus, it may be 
inappropriate to treat the proportion of ROT ﬁ  rms as 
constant across policy regimes.
This result reinforces the point that, when evaluating 
alternative policy regimes, it is crucial to carefully 
consider the underlying reasons for observed eco-
nomic behaviour. As this example demonstrates, 
taking into account the behavioural responses of 
economic agents can cause a source of structural 
persistence to become regime dependent. Though it 
is difﬁ  cult to predict the precise nature and magnitude 
of behavioural responses, it is nonetheless valuable to 
analyze the risks they pose.
Conclusion
In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, the past two 
decades in Canada have been characterized by very 
low inﬂ  ation persistence, and the timing of the reduc-
tion appears to coincide with the formal adoption of 
inﬂ  ation targeting by the Bank of Canada. Theoretical 
explanations for the observed decline include good 
monetary policy, structural change, and the good luck 
argument. Good monetary policy has been linked to a 
decoupling of long-term inﬂ  ation expectations from 
current economic conditions, as well as to lower 
variance in inﬂ  ation and output, since monetary policy 
now actively responds to economic developments in 
order to maintain price stability. Simulations with 
ToTEM suggest that changes to the conduct of 
monetary policy can explain most, but not all, of the 
observed decline in inﬂ  ation persistence. These 
results also suggest that the underlying degree of 
structural persistence in inﬂ  ation in the Canadian 
economy is low. Other things being equal, this means 
that monetary policy in Canada need not be as 
forward looking as it would need to be if persistence 
was high. It also means that the optimal time horizon 
over which inﬂ  ation should return to the target, 
following a disturbance, is shorter than would other-
wise be the case.
For a central bank considering the relative merits of 
price-level versus inﬂ  ation targeting, recent research 
suggests that low structural persistence in inﬂ  ation 
will tend to favour the former. Moreover, the transition 
period to a price-level-targeting regime, when the 
private sector may still be learning about the precise 
nature of the change, appears to be less costly when 
structural inﬂ  ation persistence is low. 
degree of inﬂ  ation persistence in Canada during the 
inﬂ  ation-targeting era implies that only a small propor-
tion of ﬁ  rms follow simple rules of thumb (Benati 2008; 
Murchison and Rennison 2006). This lends support to 
the idea that PLT can yield material improvements 
over IT for economic stability in Canada.
The beneﬁ  ts of PLT also depend crucially on the 
assumption that economic agents understand the 
policy regime. In the period immediately following a 
switch from IT to PLT, economic agents may not fully 
appreciate the differences between the two regimes. 
If ﬁ  rms do not understand PLT, they will not take 
account of its effect on future demand conditions 
when setting prices. Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueber-
feldt (2008) show that, in this situation, PLT can lead 
to worse outcomes than IT. The reason is simple: 
failure to correctly understand the policy regime cuts 
off the expectations channel. Thus, the speed with 
which economic agents learn to understand the new 
regime is an important factor in assessing the merits 
of moving from IT to PLT.
The beneﬁ  ts of PLT depend 
crucially on the assumption that 
economic agents understand 
the policy regime.
Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007) study the transition 
from IT to PLT in an environment in which economic 
agents learn about the new regime through econo-
metric estimation. The rate at which agents learn 
depends on the information they can glean from 
observed data. The authors show that the speed of 
learning is faster, and the transition costs smaller, if 
the degree of structural inﬂ  ation persistence is lower. 
Given these results, it is tempting to conclude that 
ROT behaviour is not a concern for PLT in Canada. A 
potential risk to this conclusion is that it treats the 
importance of ROT behaviour as ﬁ  xed across policy 
regimes. Amano, Mendes, and Murchison (2009) 
show that a major regime change may lead ﬁ  rms to 
revisit their decision to follow a simple ROT. Firms 
likely choose to do so in order to economize on the 
costs of gathering information and of rationally 
forecasting future economic conditions. Their willing-
ness to follow an ROT will depend on how well that 
rule performs in terms of proﬁ  tability relative to the 
proﬁ  ts associated with forward-looking behaviour.
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